Nebraska Law Review
Volume 98

Issue 3

Article 6

2020

Sports Gambling in Nebraska: A Good Bet for the Good Life
Brett M. Bruneteau
University of Nebraska College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr

Recommended Citation
Brett M. Bruneteau, Sports Gambling in Nebraska: A Good Bet for the Good Life, 98 Neb. L. Rev. 718
(2019)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol98/iss3/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Note*

Sports Gambling in Nebraska:
A Good Bet for the Good Life
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. History of Sports Betting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Federal Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(PASPA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association .
1. The Meaning of PASPA’s Authorization
Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. The Anticommandeering Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. The Supremacy Clause and Preemption . . . . . . . .
4. The Severability Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. Sports Gambling in Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Constitutional Referendum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Interstate Pressure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
C. Reasons for Legalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Economic Incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Public Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Consumer Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
D. Proposed Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Nebraska Gaming Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Nebraska Department of Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Nebraska Gamblers Assistance Program . . . . . . .
IV. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

719
720
720
724
725
728
728
730
731
732
733
733
735
736
737
738
740
741
742
744
745
745

© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a response to this Note in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* Brett M. Bruneteau earned a JD from the University of Nebraska and MBA from
the University of Vermont. He was drafted by the Washington Capitals in the
2007 NHL Entry Draft, competed internationally with Team USA, and
participated at the NCAA Division I level. In addition, Bruneteau has several
years of industry experience working for the Philadelphia Flyers (NHL) and
United States Premier Hockey League (USPHL).

718

2020]

A GOOD BET FOR THE GOOD LIFE

719

I. INTRODUCTION
Nebraska should legalize and regulate sports gambling. In May
2018, the Supreme Court struck down the Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (PASPA), a federal bill designed to ban sports
gambling across the United States. Consequently, sports gambling became a state issue. Each state must now decide whether to continue
prohibiting or to legalize and regulate sports gambling. The Supreme
Court’s decision has sparked a state-by-state debate over the benefits
of legalizing sports gambling. This Note examines those benefits and
discusses how and why Nebraska should legalize and regulate sports
gambling.
Part II provides a background on sports gambling. It examines
three distinct periods of sports gambling history: the early colonization of America, the turn of the nineteenth century, and the time between the mid-1930s and the present. Part II also examines the
federal government’s attempt to regulate sports gambling, including
the enactment of PASPA.
Part II further discusses the Supreme Court’s holding that PASPA
was unconstitutional. It examines the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association1 by discussing
PASPA’s “authorization” provision and how it pertains to the anticommandeering doctrine, the Supremacy Clause, and the severability doctrine. In addition, Part II examines the fallout from the Supreme
Court’s holding in Murphy and how each state must now choose prohibition or legalization and regulation.
Part III discusses why and how Nebraska should legalize and regulate sports gambling. It looks at the economic benefits of legalization,
including how new streams of revenue can offset Nebraska’s growing
deficit. Moreover, it examines how public sentiment supports legalization efforts. In addition, legalization would increase employment opportunities. Part III also discusses key consumer protection
components and why regulations should be implemented.
Finally, Part III proposes statutory language for creating the Nebraska Gaming Commission and enabling it to regulate sports gambling. The newly created commission would be directly supervised by
the Nebraska Department of Revenue. In addition, Part III prescribes
the regulatory power and responsibilities for the Commission, including tax and enforcement powers, and the responsibility to support the
Nebraska Gamblers Assistance Program. Lastly, Part III examines
the various pathways for the legalization of sports gambling in
Nebraska.
1. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
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II. BACKGROUND
It is difficult to understand the Supreme Court’s holding in Murphy2 without first understanding sports betting, its history, its subsequent federal regulation, and the grounds for which Murphy was
challenged. This Part seeks to provide a background of these issues
and their interplay with the State of Nebraska.
A.

History of Sports Betting

The United States has had a long and complicated relationship
with sports betting.3 Questions of legality and morality have continually been raised throughout its history.4 The history of sports betting
in the United States can be divided into three distinct periods: the
early colonization of America, the turn of the nineteenth century, and
the time between the mid-1930s and the present.5
The first period began with the colonization of America during the
seventeenth century. In New England and Pennsylvania Puritan values prevailed.6 Puritans believed that gambling was a sinful vice; consequently, gambling was banned in many of the New England and
Pennsylvania colonies.7 Other colonists, like those in Jamestown, Virginia, however, did not hold the same beliefs as the Puritans.8 Many of
these settlers maintained their English attitude toward gambling and
even considered “gentleman’s games” to be a symbol of the “gambling
spirit” which characterized an American settler.9 As the English presence grew in America, gambling also became more popular.
During this time gambling was often regulated by the locality and
used as a source of revenue.10 Local governments used gambling revenues to “build cities, establish universities, and even to help finance
2. Id.
3. Justin Fielkow et al., Tackling PASPA: The Past, Present, and Future of Sports
Gambling in America, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 23, 25 (2016); I. Nelson Rose, The Rise
and Fall of the Third Wave: Gambling Will Be Outlawed in Forty Years, AM.
POL’Y ROUNDTABLE (May 12, 2006), https://aproundtable.org/news.cfm?news_ID=
1288&issuecode=casino [https://perma.unl.edu/78S3-U675].
4. Zach Schreiber, The Time Is Now: Why the United States Should Adopt the British Model of Sports Betting Legislation, 27 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 353, 357 (2017).
5. Id. at 357–62.
6. Id. at 358.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.; JOHN M. FINDLAY, PEOPLE OF CHANCE: GAMBLING IN AMERICAN SOCIETY FROM
JAMESTOWN TO LAS VEGAS, 14–15 (1986).
10. Chil Woo, All Bets Are Off: Revisiting the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 569, 571 (2013).
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the Revolutionary War.”11 Revenue from American gambling helped
establish or improve:
Harvard, Yale, Kings College (Columbia University), Princeton, Rutgers,
Dartmouth, Rhode Island College (Brown University), the University of Pennsylvania, the University of North Carolina, and the University of Michigan,
the benefit of the Masons, the fortification of New York City and Philadelphia,
the construction of roads, hospitals, lighthouses and jails, the promotion of
literature, the improvement of navigation on rivers, the development of industry, and even the construction of churches.12

Between 1746 and the mid-1800s revenue from gambling funded “47
colleges, 300 lower schools and 200 church groups.”13 Thus, gambling
became immensely popular.
The second period coincided with the California Gold Rush and ran
through the turn of the nineteenth century.14 “The frontier spirit was
revitalized, along with a seemingly endless supply of gold with which
to gamble.”15 Omaha, Nebraska was founded in 1854 and quickly became “an oasis for people who were traveling west.”16 It was also a
“hardscrabble place” for farmers and travelers.17 It was a place where
people would frequently drink and gamble before traveling across the
prairie.18 Some gambling experts even noted that the definition of
gambling, “to take a risk to gain some advantage,” fit Omaha and its
frontier spirit.19
Gambling gained even more momentum with the rise of horse racing and baseball during the turn of the nineteenth century. Horse racing became popular with the first running of the “Belmont Stakes,
Preakness Stakes, and Kentucky Derby . . . in 1867, 1873, and 1875,
respectively.”20 By the turn of the century horse racing had become so
popular that fans could place wagers at over 300 racetracks nationwide.21 In Nebraska, Omaha’s Aksarben racetrack began in 1919.22
The Aksarben racetrack was “the most remarkable success story” in
11. Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical Examination of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 12 (1992).
12. Id. at 25.
13. Id. See HERBERT ASBURY, SUCKER’S PROGRESS: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF GAMBLING IN AMERICA FROM THE COLONIES TO CANFIELD 77–78 (1938).
14. Schreiber, supra note 4, at 359–60.
15. Id. at 359.
16. Omaha’s Gambling History, NEB. EDUC. TELECOMMS. ¶ 4 (Oct. 14, 2008), https://
web.archive.org/web/20081014040343/http://www.netnebraska.org/extras/statewide/pers/transcripts/Omaha%20Gambling%20History.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/S6NM-3TTG] (originally aired on Nebraska ETV Program Statewide Oct. 1,
2004).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at ¶ 5.
20. See Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 25–26, 26 n.18.
21. Id. at 26 n.18.
22. AK-SAR-BEN Horse Racing History, AK-SAR-BEN.COM, http://www.ak-sar-ben
.com/ [https://perma.unl.edu/54JX-C674] (last visited July 10, 2018).
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all of horse racing.23 On any given Saturday, “the roar of the crowd
reverberated like thunder over the Nebraska plains.”24 Indeed, the
“whole city loved its racetrack.”25
At the same time, professional baseball was also on the rise. Baseball was more than a game during the Progressive Era.26 It was emblematic of America’s social structure.27 “Its teamwork showed
democracy in action; its fans were found among all classes of society; it
taught America’s traditional values to successive waves of immigrants; and it served as an annual ritual which united cities behind
their teams.”28
However, the popularity of horse racing and baseball was followed
by a rise in corruption and scandal. Shortly after Nebraska opened its
Aksarben racetrack, the most infamous sports betting scandal in
American history took place just a few hours to the east in Chicago. At
that time, the nation’s conscience was shocked to discover that a crime
syndicate had bribed members of the Chicago White Sox to throw the
1919 World Series.29 Public outcry was immense. The eight players
involved were dubbed the “Black Sox” for tarnishing America’s beloved sport.30 Additionally, they were banned from baseball and indicted with five other gamblers by a grand jury.31
Public sentiment toward gambling had reached a new low.32 Moreover, the public began associating sports betting with criminal activities, gangsters, and threats to its beloved pastimes.33 The event
immortalized a little boy’s plea—“say it ain’t so, Joe!”—to White Sox
star player, “Shoeless” Joe Jackson.34 The plight was heard around
the world.35
23. Andrew Beyer, Commentary: The Rapid Rise and Fall of Aksarben, WASH. POST
(July 24, 1994), http://articles.latimes.com/1994-07-24/sports/sp-19356_1_aksarben-races [https://perma.unl.edu/KHA4-B54W].
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Allen Boyer, The Great Gatsby, the Black Sox, High Finance, and American Law,
88 MICH. L. REV. 328, 332 (1989).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.; Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 26. See Douglas Linder, The Black Sox Trial:
An Account, FAMOUS TRIALS (2010), http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/
blacksox/blacksox.html [https://perma.unl.edu/A3X7-M8HM] (last visited July
10, 2018).
30. See Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 26.
31. See Michael W. Klein, Rose Is in Red, Black Sox Are Blue: A Comparison of Rose
v. Giamatti and the 1921 Black Sox Trial, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 551,
573, 585 (1990).
32. See Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 26.
33. Woo, supra note 10, at 572–73.
34. Schreiber, supra note 4, at 361.
35. Id.
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In response to the scandal professional baseball appointed Judge
Kenesaw Mountain Landis as its first commissioner.36 Judge Landis
was tasked with restoring baseball’s image and upholding the integrity of the sport.37 Soon thereafter, many other professional sports
leagues joined baseball and appointed commissioners to do the
same.38 Moreover, the scandal fueled groups who were opposed to
gambling on moral grounds.39 The combination of scandal and moral
opposition led to a progressive movement to ban gambling in the
United States.40 After being celebrated during the 1800s, “by the beginning of the twentieth century, virtually all forms of gambling were
illegal.”41
The third period began during the 1930s, shortly after the Great
Depression.42 Following the Great Depression the need for revenue
compelled many states to legalize certain forms of gambling again.43
In 1931 Massachusetts made bingo and charitable gambling legal.44
That same year Nevada also legalized many forms of gambling.45 In
1935 Nebraska legalized pari-mutuel betting on horse racing again.46
Sports betting, however, was still banned throughout the country.47
Consequently, large multi-state crime syndicates began to fill the
void.48 They organized sportsbooks and operations to meet the new
surge in popularity of sports—specifically, professional baseball, professional football, collegiate football, and collegiate basketball.49 For
nearly three decades, the “syndicates openly defied state gambling
laws by using the telegraph and telephone” to communicate and trans36. Kenesaw Mountain Landis, MLB, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/mlb_history_
people.jsp?story=com_bio_1 [https://perma.unl.edu/6PEL-W3KP] (last visited
July 10, 2018).
37. Woo, supra note 10, at 573.
38. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 26.
39. See Woo, supra note 10, at 572.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.; Schreiber, supra note 4, at 362.
43. Woo, supra note 10, at 572.
44. Id.
45. Id. See Major Events in Nevada Gaming History, THE WAGERING RESOURCE,
http://www.wageringresource.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=163&Itemid=111 [https://perma.unl.edu/5P4H-YHRP] (last updated Apr. 3,
2016).
46. Roland J. Santoni, An Introduction to Nebraska Gaming Law, 29 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1123, 1130 (1996). See generally State ex rel. Sorensen v. Ak-Sar-Ben Exposition Co., 118 Neb. 851, 860–61, 226 N.W. 705, 709 (1929) (setting the foundation for a 1934 campaign to amend the Nebraska Constitution and allow for parimutuel wagering).
47. See Woo, supra note 10, at 573 (noting that sports betting was not legal again
“until Nevada authorized sports betting in standalone locations in 1955 and hotel
sportsbooks in 1975”).
48. Id. at 573–74.
49. Id.
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act business.50 By the early 1960s it became clear that the states
lacked the resources to investigate or prosecute the syndicates.51 Indeed, the problem of organized crime had grown so much that Congress believed it needed to intervene.52
B.

Federal Intervention

Congress intervened by creating a series of federal laws that included the Interstate Wire Act of 1961,53 the International Travel Act
of 1961,54 the Interstate Transportation of Wagering Paraphernalia
Act (1961),55 the Sports Bribery Act of 1964,56 and the Illegal Gambling and Business Act (1970).57 In effect, these laws supported statebased gambling laws by making their violation a federal offense as
well.58 Consequently, these laws enabled the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Justice (DOJ) to investigate and
prosecute multistate crime syndicates.59
Even so, illegal sports gambling persisted in the United States.60
In 1976 the Commission on the Review of the National Policy Toward
Gambling (the Commission) issued a report stating that gambling
laws could not be effectively enforced61 “The Commission found that
over two-thirds of the population had indulged in gambling and approximately 80% of the population approved of gambling.”62 Moreover,
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

58.
59.
60.
61.

62.

Id. at 574.
Schreiber, supra note 4, at 363.
Id.
Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-216, 75 Stat. 491 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1084 (2012)).
Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1952 (2012)).
Act of Sept. 13, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-218, 75 Stat. 492 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1953 (2012 & Supp. 2014)).
Act of June 6, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-316, 78 Stat. 203 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 224 (2012)).
Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 803(a), 84 Stat. 922, 937–38 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (2012 & Supp. 2014)). The Illegal Gambling Business Act was enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.),
which also contains the well-known Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, section 901(a) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968
(2012 & Supp. 2016)).
Schreiber, supra note 4, at 364.
See id.
See Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 28.
COMM’N ON THE REV. OF THE NAT’L POL’Y TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING IN
AMERICA, at ix– x (1976), https://ia802205.us.archive.org/4/items/gamblinginamer
ic00unit/gamblinginameric00unit.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/2QYQ-CR78] (noting the Commission was created by Congress as a part of the Organized Crime
Control Act, and it conducted forty-three days of hearings and received testimony
from approximately 275 witnesses).
Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 28.

2020]

A GOOD BET FOR THE GOOD LIFE

725

the Commission stated, “Gambling is inevitable. No matter what is
said or done by advocates or opponents of gambling in all its various
forms, it is an activity that is practiced, or tacitly endorsed, by a substantial majority of Americans.”63
Following the Commission’s report, the DOJ put “a low priority on
enforcement of antigambling laws.”64 Accordingly, illegal gambling
continued. In 1983 it was estimated that nearly $8 billion was gambled illegally on sports in America.65 By 1989 that number had quadrupled to $50 billion.66 Consequently, as gamblers wagered more the
public became more concerned about corruption and match-fixing.67
In 1980 it was revealed that Boston College basketball players were
involved in point-shaving.68 In 1985 three more basketball players
were indicted for point-shaving at Tulane University.69 Finally, in
1989 another sports betting scandal rocked professional baseball
when it was determined that Pete Rose “bet on baseball.”70 Like the
Black Sox, Pete Rose also received a lifetime ban from the sport.71 In
addition, the public’s concern and moral opposition to sports scandals
and gambling had been reignited. In 1992 Congress enacted the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act.
C.

Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA)

The enactment of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act (PASPA) federalized the regulation of sports betting.72 Prior to
PASPA state laws governed sports betting.73 The federal government
simply supported those laws by the aforementioned means.74 These
federal laws were meant to prevent interstate sports betting.75 They
were not supposed to affect intrastate sports betting.76 That issue was
left to the states. However, that all changed with the enactment of
PASPA.
63. COMM’N ON THE REV. OF THE NAT’L POL’Y TOWARD GAMBLING, supra note 61, at 1.
64. Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 28 (quoting Bart Barnes, Friendly Wagers to Big
Bookmaking, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 1982), https://www.washingtonpost.com/arch
ive/sports/1982/01/18/friendly-wagers-to-big-bookmaking/73abae5a-3ce8-47f0-97
40-b1bb83328ec1 [https://perma.unl.edu/EK83-P4XR]).
65. Id. at 29.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 30.
73. Id.
74. See supra notes 53–59 and accompanying text; Woo, supra note 10, at 574.
75. Woo, supra note 10, at 574.
76. Id.
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The enactment of PASPA took the regulatory authority from the
states and placed it in the hands of the federal government.77 Its purpose was “to stop the spread of State-sponsored sports gambling” and
maintain the integrity of sports.78 Indeed, § 3702 provides:
It shall be unlawful for (1) a governmental entity to sponsor, operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact, or (2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a
governmental entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or
wagering scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the use of geographical
references or otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur
or professional athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or
more performances of such athletes in such games.79

The enactment of PASPA was also at a critical moment during the
debate over sports betting.80 During that time, thirteen “ ‘[s]tates
[were] considering a wide variety of [s]tate-sponsored gambling
schemes, including allow[ing] sports gambling on river boats . . .
[sports betting] at off-track betting parlors . . . casino-style sports
books,’ and ‘sports theme[s] for [state] lotteries.’ ”81 The professional
sports leagues opposed gambling and were concerned with upholding
the integrity of sports and preventing another Pete Rose-type incident.82 On their side was Senator Bill Bradley, a former professional
basketball player and leading advocate for PASPA, which was commonly coined the “Bradley Bill.”83
Consequently, a compromise was struck. To enact PASPA Congress exempted states with legalized sports-wagering schemes already
in operation.84 Of the fifty states only Delaware,85 Montana,86 Ne77. Id.
78. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2006). A “governmental entity” is defined to include “a State, a
political subdivision of a State, or an entity or organization . . . that has governmental authority within the territorial boundaries of the United States . . . .” 28
U.S.C. § 3701 (2006).
80. See SEN. REP. NO. 102-248, at 8. Bradley also stated that “[s]ports betting threatens the integrity of and public confidence in professional and amateur team
sports, converting sports from wholesome athletic entertainment into a vehicle
for gambling. Sports gambling raises people’s suspicions about point-shaving and
game-fixing . . . If sports betting spreads, more and more fans will question every
coaching decision and official’s call.” 138 CONG. REC. S17434-01 (daily ed. Oct. 7,
1992) (statement of Sen. Bradley).
81. Woo, supra note 10, at 575 (quoting SEN. REP. NO. 102-248, at 4); 28 U.S.C.
§ 3702 (2006).
82. Woo, supra note 10, at 575.
83. Schreiber, supra note 4, at 367.
84. Caitlin D. Buckstaff, Note, Covering the Spread: An Assessment of Amateurism
and Vulnerability of Student-Athletes in an Emerging Culture of Sports Wagering, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 133, 140 (2013).
85. See generally Joshua Winneker et al., Sports Gambling and the Expanded Sovereignty Doctrine, 13 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 38, 41 (2013) (“In 1976, Delaware had
a sports lottery, which allowed for multi-game parlay betting for one football season without any success. However, for years the Delaware legislature had been
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vada,87 and Oregon88 satisfied the exemption.89 Congress, however,
also created a one-year window for additional states to enact sportswagering schemes to meet the exemption.90 The concept was created
with New Jersey’s Atlantic City in mind.91 Neither New Jersey nor
any other state took advantage of the one-year provision.92 Consequently, only four states had exemptions to PASPA.
Nevertheless, illegal sports betting persisted, leading many states
to question the effectiveness and constitutionality of PASPA.93 The
states voiced their concerns over PASPA’s violations of federalism and
the Commerce Clause.94 They also questioned how standards could
exist for a ban in states that had exemptions.95 Furthermore, they argued the bill was not even accomplishing what it intended—stopping
the spread of illegal sports gambling.96 Accordingly, these states ar-

86.

87.

88.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

trying to bring back the sports lottery in order to profit off of the growing popularity of gambling along mid-Atlantic seaboard.”).
See generally id. at 42 (“Montana legalized a sports lottery in 1973. In 2007, the
Montana Legislature passed Mont. Code Ann § 23-4-201, a law designed to help
the Board of Horse Racing increase purses in Montana. In August 2008, under
the authority of Mont. Code Ann § 23-4-201, the Montana Lottery began what is
called Montana Sports Action. The Board of Horse Racing may also use the funds
raised in other ways to stimulate horse racing in Montana. The State of Montana
allows a variety of sports gambling, including the popular fantasy sports leagues,
sports tab games, sports pools, and Calcutta pools. In the fourth quarter of 2012
alone, the Montana Department of Justice reported that they collected over $14
million in taxes solely from video gambling machines.”).
See generally id. at 40–41 (Nevada legalized sports betting in 1975. The goal was
to create “thousands” of jobs and bring “millions” of tourists to the state. “This
new law became the standard for Nevada casinos, as nearly every casino in Las
Vegas contains a sports book. After the new law was passed, sports betting
boomed and by 2004, sports books were nearly everywhere. In 2012, gross revenue for Nevada’s sports books was $170 million.”).
See generally id. at 42–43 (“An amendment to the Oregon Constitution, approved
by 66% of the voters in the 1984 election, created the Oregon Lottery. In 1989, the
lottery began Sports Action and began allowing participants to bet on NFL football games. When Congress banned sports gambling under PASPA, Oregon was
privileged to continue the game because they were grandfathered in. game. [sic]
Oregon lawmakers ended Sports Action after the 2006–07 NFL season, in hopes
of hosting the NCAA Men’s Division I Basketball Championship games. Thus,
Oregon was forced to forgo its revenue producing activity in order to maintain the
good graces of the NCAA.”).
See Ronald J. Rychlak, A Bad Bet: Federal Criminalization of Nevada’s Collegiate
Sports Books, 4 NEV. L.J. 320, 323 (2004).
Buckstaff, supra note 84, at 141.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Michael Levinson, A Sure Bet: Why New Jersey Would Benefit from Legalized Sports Wagering, 13 SPORTS L.J. 143, 169 (2006).
Buckstaff, supra note 84, at 142.
Id.
Id.
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gued that a repeal of PASPA was necessary.97 In Murphy,98 the Supreme Court ruled that PASPA was unconstitutional.
D.

Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association

On December 4, 2017, the Supreme Court heard New Jersey’s challenge to PASPA.99 The question presented to the Supreme Court was
whether the federal government had commandeered the regulatory
power of the states by prohibiting the modification or repeal of certain
state statutes.100 Specifically, whether PASPA can indirectly prohibit
the States from modifying or repealing their sports wagering laws.101
In support of New Jersey’s constitutional challenge, Nebraska and
seventeen other states filed briefs of amici curiae.102
The Supreme Court held that the intent of PASPA was to prohibit
the states from modifying or repealing their sports wagering laws.103
In addition, the Court stated that PASPA commandeered the states’
regulatory powers104 and did not qualify for preemption under the
Supremacy Clause.105 Consequently, Congress overstepped its constitutional powers, thus rendering PASPA, in its entirety,
unconstitutional.106
1.

The Meaning of PASPA’s Authorization Provision

Before determining constitutionality, the Supreme Court had to
determine the meaning of the word “authorize” in the context of
PASPA.107 PASPA provides no state can “authorize” sports “betting,
gambling, or wagering.”108 Therefore, the meaning of “authorize”
plays a key role in determining whether PASPA is constitutional.109
The states argued that “authorize” had a broad meaning and was
synonymous with the word “permit.”110 The states contended that
“any state law that ha[d] the effect of permitting sports gambling, in97. Id.
98. Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1466 (2018).
99. See SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S. GRANTED & NOTED LIST OCTOBER TERM 2017
CASES FOR ARGUMENT (June 28, 2018), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/
17grantednotedlist.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/ZZS7-288D].
100. Brief of Amici Curiae States of W. Va., 17 Other States, and the Governors of Ky.,
Md., and N.D. in Support of Petitioners at i, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 137 S. Ct. 2327 (2017) (No. 16-476).
101. Id.
102. See id.
103. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1466.
104. See id. at 1466–67.
105. See id. at 1467.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 1473.
108. See 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (1992).
109. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1473.
110. Id.
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cluding a law totally or partially repealing a prior prohibition,
amount[ed] to an authorization.”111 This interpretation, the states argued, would amount to PASPA’s violation of the Constitution, by commandeering the states’ regulatory powers.112 In response, the sports
leagues argued the word should be interpreted more narrowly.113
They argued it required an affirmative act.114 “To authorize, they
maintain[ed], means ‘[t]o empower; to give a right or authority to act;
to endow with authority.’ ”115 Thus, PASPA’s anti-authorization provision allowed the states to fully repeal sports betting laws but did not
allow the states to partially repeal them.116 Partial repeal, the sports
leagues contended, gave preferred treatment to certain entities over
others which empowered those certain entities.117 Consequently, a
partial repeal that empowered certain entities amounted to an affirmative action.118 Therefore, an affirmative action in the form of a partial repeal was a violation of PASPA.119
The Supreme Court agreed with the states’ interpretation of the
word authorize. In reaching its conclusion the Court took an originalist approach,120 focusing on the states’ legal landscape at the time of
PASPA’s adoption.121 At that time, sports wagering was illegal in the
great majority of states.122 Therefore, any type of repeal, partial or
full, would lead one to believe that sports wagering had been “permitted.”123 In drawing this conclusion the Court noted the interplay between authorization and prohibition:
The concept of state “authorization” makes sense only against a backdrop of
prohibition or regulation. A State is not regarded as authorizing everything
that it does not prohibit or regulate. No one would use the term in that way.
For example, no one would say that a State “authorizes” its residents to brush
their teeth or eat apples or sing in the shower. We commonly speak of state
authorization only if the activity in question would otherwise be restricted.124
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
See id. at 1478.
Id. at 1473.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ozan O. Varol, The Origins and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 44
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1239, 1248 (2011). Originalism refers to a method of interpretation whereby one seeks to uncover the meaning of a provision at the time
it was enacted.
Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1474.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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Additionally, the Court concluded that Congress intended to prohibit
sports wagering at the time of PASPA’s enactment.125 In the spirit of
originalism, Congress’s intent plays an important role in interpreting
the word “authorize.” Although the sports leagues contended a more
complex interpretation was needed, the Court concluded that it was
“improbable that Congress meant to enact such a nebulous regime.”126
Furthermore, the interpretation of the word “authorize” by the sports
leagues “not only ignores the situation that Congress faced when it
enacted PASPA but also leads to results that Congress is most unlikely to have wanted.”127
2.

The Anticommandeering Doctrine

The Court held PASPA violated the anticommandeering doctrine
implicit in the United States Constitution by prohibiting the states
from authorizing sports wagering.128 The anticommandeering doctrine prevents the Federal Government from commandeering the
states’ legislative processes to enact, enforce, or prohibit certain
acts.129 The doctrine is important for three reasons. First, it serves as
a protection of liberty implicit to the Constitution.130 Second, the doctrine promotes political accountability by making clear the responsibility of state and federal governments.131 Finally, it prevents
Congress from shifting the costs of its programs and regulations onto
the states.132 Ultimately, the doctrine makes clear “Congress may not
simply commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
program.”133
Accordingly, Justice Alito’s opinion for the majority was a scorching rebuke of PASPA and its prohibition on sports wagering:
The PASPA provision at issue here—prohibiting state authorization of sports
gambling—violates the anticommandeering rule. That provision unequivocally dictates what a state legislature may and may not do. And this is true
under either our interpretation or that advocated by respondents and the
United States. In either event, state legislatures are put under the direct control of Congress. It is as if federal officers were installed in state legislative
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

130.
131.
132.
133.

See id. at 1474–75.
Id. at 1475.
Id.
Id. at 1478.
See id. at 1477. See also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)
(“We have always understood that even where Congress has the authority under
the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the
power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.”).
See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1477.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1477 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S.
264, 288 (1981)).
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chambers and were armed with the authority to stop legislators from voting
on any offending proposals. A more direct affront to state sovereignty is not
easy to imagine.134

In reaching this conclusion, the Court held that the federal government could not commandeer a state’s legislative process by requiring
action or inaction.135 Ultimately, Justice Alito made clear that no federal regulatory scheme—including one that prohibits sports wagering—can be used to commandeer the states’ legislative process. As a
result, PASPA’s provision prohibiting the states from authorizing
sports wagering was held unconstitutional.
3.

The Supremacy Clause and Preemption

Moreover, the Court held in Murphy that PASPA cannot preempt
state law via the Supremacy Clause because PASPA does not meet the
preemption requirements of the Constitution.136 The Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution is a rule that requires federal law preempt
state law in matters of conflict.137
To qualify for preemption, a federal law must meet two requirements: (1) it must be within Congress’s constitutional power, and (2) it
must govern private actors, since the Constitution does not confer
upon Congress the power to regulate states.138 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has identified three types of preemption based on these
requirements.139 Each works in a similar manner, whereby “Congress
enacts a law that imposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors; a state law confers rights or imposes restrictions that conflict
with the federal law; and therefore the federal law takes precedence
and the state law is preempted.”140 The three types of preemption are:
conflict preemption, express preemption, and field preemption.141 Regardless of the various types of preemption, a provision must first
meet the original two requirements of the Supremacy Clause.
134. Id. at 1478.
135. See id. at 1479 (“In sum, none of the prior decisions on which respondents and the
United States rely involved federal laws that commandeered the state legislative
process. None concerned laws that directed the States either to enact or to refrain
from enacting a regulation of the conduct of activities occurring within their borders. Therefore, none of these precedents supports the constitutionality of the
PASPA provision at issue here.”).
136. See id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1480. See also English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79 (1990) (explaining that federal law preempts state law when (1) Congress intends the federal
law to preempt state law, (2) state law attempts to preside in a field that Congress intended federal law to solely occupy, and (3) state and federal law are actually in conflict).
140. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1480.
141. See id.
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PASPA’s provision prohibiting the states from authorizing sports
wagering does not meet the two Supremacy Clause requirements, and
thus, cannot preempt state law.142 The Court illustrated this principle
by explaining that if a private citizen or company began a sports wagering operation PASPA would not provide the Attorney General with
grounds for a civil action.143 “[T]here is simply no way to understand
the provision prohibiting state authorization as anything other than a
direct command to the States. And that is exactly what the anticommandeering rule does not allow.”144
4.

The Severability Doctrine

The unconstitutional provision of PASPA is not severable from any
other provision in its statute.145 The provision violates the anticommandeering doctrine and fails to meet the requirements of preemption.146 After determining a statutory provision is unconstitutional, it
is necessary for the Court to consider if other provisions of the statute
may still be salvaged to save the law.147
“Severability is usually an afterthought, a sifting through the statutory rubble to salvage whatever survives a ruling that part of the law
is unconstitutional.”148 In this respect, the Court must decide what to
do with the remainder of a statute when one or more provisions are
found to be unconstitutional.149 The Court may find an unconstitutional provision could be eliminated while leaving the remainder of
the statute in effect or it may strike down the statute in its
entirety.150
Justice Alito, writing for the majority, stated that PASPA must be
struck down in its entirety for three reasons. First, “[i]f the provisions
prohibiting state authorization and licensing are stricken but the prohibition on state ‘operat[ion]’ is left standing, the result would be a
scheme sharply different from what Congress contemplated when
PASPA was enacted.”151 According to Justice Alito, it would be “most
unlikely” that Congress would have wanted PASPA to legalize sports
wagering amongst private enterprise.152 This would be counterintui142. Id. at 1481 (noting that it is impossible to read PASPA’s anti-authorization provision as a preemption “because there is no way in which this provision can be
understood as a regulation of private actors.”).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1484.
146. Id. at 1481.
147. See id.
148. John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C. L. REV. 203, 204 (1993).
149. See Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
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tive to PASPA’s purpose, which regarded private gambling enterprises, like casinos, as more harmful than their state sponsored
counterparts.153 Second, Congress would not have wanted to sever the
provisions that prohibited private enterprise “from ‘sponsor[ing],’
‘operat[ing],’ or ‘promot[ing]’ ” sports wagering either.154 Third, the
provision prohibiting the “ ‘advertis[ing]’” of sports wagering must also
fall because it is unlikely that Congress would have wanted it to remain without the rest of the statute.155
The majority determined that no provision of PASPA was severable without defeating the purpose of the statute. Consequently, the
Court struck down PASPA in its entirety. Nevertheless, the legalization of sports gambling is still controversial.156
III. SPORTS GAMBLING IN NEBRASKA
Nebraska should legalize and regulate sports gambling. The Nebraska Constitution generally bans gambling throughout the state.157
However, there are exceptions for charitable gaming,158 state lotteries,159 and pari-mutuel betting on horse racing.160 Sports gambling
should be added to the state’s constitutional exceptions. First, this
Part examines the various ways the Nebraska Constitution can be
amended to add sports gambling to its exceptions. Next, it discusses
interstate pressure and the reasons why sports gambling should be
added as a constitutional exception. Finally, this Part proposes the
creation of the Nebraska Gaming Commission—a regulatory body
under the Nebraska Department of Revenue that also supports the
Nebraska Gamblers Assistance Program.
A.

Constitutional Referendum

There are three ways to change the Nebraska Constitution to legalize sports gambling: (1) a constitutional amendment proposed by the
153.
154.
155.
156.

157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at 1483.
Id. at 1484.
Id. at 1484–85 (“The legalization of sports gambling requires an important policy
choice, but the choice is not ours to make. Congress can regulate sports gambling
directly, but if it elects not to do so, each State is free to act on its own. Our job is
to interpret the law Congress has enacted and decide whether it is consistent
with the Constitution. PASPA is not. PASPA ‘regulate[s] state governments’ regulation’ of their citizens. The Constitution gives Congress no such power.”) (citation omitted).
NEB. CONST. art. III, § 24.
See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 9-201 to 9-266; 9-301 to 9-356; 9-401 to 9-437; 9-601 to 9653 (Reissue 2012) (authorizing certain charitable gaming, such as bingo, pickle
cards, and keno).
See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 9-801 to 9-842 (Reissue 2012).
See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 2-1201 to 2-1247 (Reissue 2012).
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legislature, (2) a constitutional amendment proposed by the state citizens, or (3) a constitutional convention where a revision, amendment,
or change is made to the Constitution.
First, Nebraska can legalize sports gambling if the legislature proposes a constitutional amendment. This is the customary method for
amending the Nebraska Constitution as laid out in Article XVI, § 1.161
It provides that legislative amendments can be adopted if 60% of the
state legislature votes in favor of the amendment.162 The legislature
can then call for a special statewide election to present the proposed
amendment to the voters.163 If they do not call for a special election,
the proposed amendment must go on the next general election ballot.164 The amendment becomes part of the constitution if it wins by a
majority and receives at least 35% of votes from those voting in an
election for any office.165
Second, Nebraska can legalize sports gambling with a proposed
constitutional amendment from the public. Known as the petition
method, the rules require signatures from at least 10% of the state’s
registered voters for the proposed amendment to be placed on the ballot.166 Groups in Nebraska have already begun the process of gathering signatures.167 ABC News Channel 8 estimates that a proposal
would need 110,000 signatures to be placed on the ballot.168 If the
required number of signatures is gathered, the ballot would be provided in the Nebraska 2020 general election.
Third, Nebraska can legalize sports gambling through a constitutional convention whereby a revision, amendment, or change is made
to the constitution. A constitutional convention is difficult to convene
because 60% of the legislators are required to approve of the proposed
convention.169 The question then goes to the public, where it must win
by a majority and receive at least 35% of those voting in an election for
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

NEB. CONST. art. XVI, § 1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
NEB. CONST. art. III, §§ 2, 4.
See, e.g., Paul Hammel, Ho-Chunk, Horsemen Launch Another Petition Drive to
Allow Casinos, Possibly Sports Betting, in Nebraska, BH NEWS SERV. (Aug. 17,
2018), https://www.nonpareilonline.com/news/region/ho-chunk-horsemen-launchanother-petition-drive-to-allow-casinos/article_777af6d6-678e-55a5-91c3-885dc9
3de376.html [https://perma.unl.edu/ZZS7-288D] (explaining that Nebraska
horsemen will partner with Ho-Chunk Inc. to “seek to place [sports gambling] on
the 2020 ballot and would involve gathering tens of thousands of signatures beginning next year.”).
168. See Joe Harris, Nebraska Sees Push to Legalize Sports Betting: Nebraskans May
Soon Be Able to Bet on Sports, ABC 8 KLKN-TV (May 18, 2018, 8:47 PM), http://
www.klkntv.com/story/38227934/nebraska-sees-push-to-legalize-sports-betting
[https://perma.unl.edu/RQC6-DGPA].
169. NEB. CONST. art. XVI, § 2.
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any office.170 After the convention is approved and initiated, voters
must still ratify any and all amendments proposed to the
constitution.171
Ultimately, the people of Nebraska will get to decide if sports gambling becomes legal—all three pathways require their approval. In
this respect, it only makes sense that a constitution for the people,
must be made, approved, and ratified by the people.
B.

Interstate Pressure

The legalization of sports gambling in nearby states like Iowa will
create economic pressure for Nebraska to do the same. As noted by
Nebraska State Senator Tyson Larson, “We are surrounded by states
that have legalized gambling. Over 90 percent of Nebraskans live
within 70 miles of a casino. We have all the social problems, but none
of the economic benefit, and that’s a problem.”172 Union Gaming Analytics determined that “Nebraskans generated nearly $327 million in
gross revenue for Iowa casinos” in 2014.173 They also accounted for
nearly 25% of all customers at those casinos.174 “It’s a tremendous loss
that we experience, in terms of taxes,” said Senator Paul Schumacher.175 Recognizing the revenue potential, many state lawmakers
have moved to legalize and regulate sports gambling.176
However, the sports betting landscape may change as more states
introduce, debate, and pass legislation to permit sports gambling. According to Chris Grove, a gaming-industry expert, “ ‘you’re looking at a
few distinct waves’ in how states will proceed” with legislation.177 The
first wave comprises those states that already had bills drafted, and
were just waiting for a favorable Supreme Court decision.178 The second wave is “a slightly larger set of states whose legislatures are still
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Carly Jensen, Small Possibility of Sports Betting Coming to Nebraska, 1011
NOW (May 14, 2018, 10:32 PM), https://www.1011now.com/content/news/Smallpossibility-of-sports-betting-coming-to-Nebraska-482616131.html [https://perma
.unl.edu/2YF2-LP7D].
173. Associated Press, Report: Nearly a Quarter of Iowa’s Casino Revenue Last Year
Came from Nebraska Residents, FOX BUS. (June 23, 2014), https://www.foxbusi
ness.com/markets/report-nearly-a-quarter-of-iowas-casino-revenue-last-yearcame-from-nebraska-residents [https://perma.unl.edu/3ELX-3K56].
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Steve Berkowitz & Tom Schad, Your State-By-State Guide to Sports Betting
in Light of Supreme Court Ruling, USA TODAY (May 14, 2018, 7:47 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2018/05/14/sports-gambling-status-every-stateafter-supreme-court-ruling/607334002/ [https://perma.unl.edu/5V2U-3PCM].
177. Berkowitz & Schad, supra note 176.
178. Id.
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in session and have sports-betting bills pending.”179 The third wave
will likely be the largest, according to Grove, waiting until 2019 to
begin their legislative process.180 However, “[h]ow, and when, states
move on this ‘will be heavily influenced by the actions of neighboring
states,’” he added.181
Thus, the national regulatory landscape for sports betting may be
uncertain and evolving, but it is clearly trending toward legalization.182 For states like Nebraska that prohibit full-blown sports betting,183 old laws would need to be repealed or amended before sports
betting would be allowed.184 If states choose to permit sports betting
they must carefully draft legislation and regulation to reflect their
constituents’ values.185 States must also weigh prohibition against the
financial benefits from revenues derived from regulation.186 These are
difficult decisions. Indeed, as the gaming industry’s prediction suggests, these decisions may take some time.187 Nevertheless, because of
Murphy, Nebraska must confront this new reality.
C.

Reasons for Legalization

Many states and lawmakers are now discussing the benefits of legalizing sports betting. For Nebraska, the legalization of sports betting has numerous economic incentives and public support. Potential
concerns can also be offset with strong integrity standards and regulations. On balance, the legalization of sports betting in Nebraska would
be a good bet for the good life.

179. Id.; Tribune News Serv., Show Me The Money: Sports Betting Off And Running,
FOSTERS.COM (Sept. 15, 2018), http://www.fosters.com/zz/news/20180915/showme-money-sports-betting-off-and-running [https://perma.unl.edu/HKR5-R5QZ]
(including New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Montana).
180. Berkowitz & Schad, supra note 176.
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 24.
184. Ryan Rodenberg, United States of Sports Betting: An Updated Map of Where
Every State Stands, ESPN (Dec. 30, 2019) http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/
19740480/gambling-sports-betting-bill-tracker-all-50-states [https://perma.unl
.edu/8RCD-Y36U].
185. See generally Cindy Lange-Kubick, What Are the Odds of Sports Gambling Becoming Legal in Nebraska?, LINCOLN J. STAR (May 14, 2018), https://journalstar
.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/what-are-the-odds-of-sports-gamb
ling-becoming-legal-in/article_49d5e1c7-c523-5f41-a698-d96aec2d31ee.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/2WTN-C2GP].
186. Id.
187. Rodenberg, supra note 184.
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Economic Incentives

There are major economic incentives for Nebraska to legalize
sports gambling. Most importantly, sports gambling represents a new
stream of revenue that can be used to offset the state’s growing deficit.
A growing state deficit demands the legalization of an existing
market to raise revenues. During the last five years, Nebraska’s revenues have remained consistent while its expenditures have continued
to grow.188 Consequently, the state continues to have budget deficits.189 In 2017, expenditures outpaced revenues by $120 million.190
That number was expected to grow to $173 million by the end of
2018.191 As a result, lawmakers believe their choices are to make
spending cuts or draw from the state’s cash reserve.192 However, Nebraska’s lawmakers actually have another option—they can create a
new stream of revenue.193 More specifically, lawmakers can create a
new stream of revenue by legalizing sports gambling.194 Sports gambling allows the state to take advantage of an already-existing market
through reasonable taxation and license availability.195 Therefore, the
legalization of sports gambling creates a new stream of revenue that
lawmakers could use to offset growing deficits.196
At the time PASPA was enacted it was estimated that the U.S.
sports gambling market produced $40 billion annually.197 Today, that
same market is estimated to produce $140 billion to $400 billion annu188. STATE OF NEB. DEPT. OF ADMIN. SERVS., ANNUAL BUDGETARY REPORT: FOR THE
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 2017, at 4– 5, http://das.nebraska.gov/accounting/budrept/
buddoc17.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/65AY-8L6K].
189. See Emily Nitcher, Nebraska Legislature Faces Smaller Budget Gap than Last
Year, but Decisions Will Be Tougher, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (Jan. 1, 2018),
https://www.omaha.com/news/legislature/nebraska-legislature-faces-smallerbudget-gap-than-last-year-but/article_7502d40e-cf97-5578-bb67-ca4b8ef69b73
.html [https://perma.unl.edu/6QFB-RWFR].
190. STATE OF NEB. DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS., supra note 188, at 4–5.
191. Nitcher, supra note 189.
192. See id.
193. See Lange-Kubick, supra note 185.
194. Id. (“Global Market Advisors . . . estimates Nebraska could see as much as $47
million in revenue if sports gambling were legalized here.”).
195. See generally Michelle Minton, Legalizing Sports Betting in the United States: A
Playbook for State Liberalization and Regulation, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST.
(Mar. 15, 2018), https://cei.org/content/legalizing-sports-betting-united-states
[https://perma.unl.edu/BD2Z-QAL7] (explaining the benefits of sports gambling
to state legislatures and their constituents).
196. Id.
197. Michelle Minton, Let States Regulate Sports Gambling Within Their Borders:
Constitutional Principles at Stake in Supreme Court Case Christie v. NCAA, COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST. (Oct. 17, 2017), https://cei.org/content/let-states-regulatesports-gambling [https://perma.unl.edu/5NMY-JTEP].
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ally.198 Nebraska has 0.6% of the U.S. population, which translates to
a conservative market size of over $900 million annually.199 In addition, Global Market Advisors suggest that Nebraska could bring in
close to $50 million of revenue annually from that market.200
However, some worry that the economic incentives may be outweighed by their social costs. On these grounds, Governor Pete Ricketts opposes the legalization of sports gambling.201 According to
Ricketts, any revenue derived from sports gambling is outstripped by
its social costs, by a ratio of at least 3-to-1.202 However, critics note
that Nebraskans will continue to gamble regardless of Ricketts’s opinion and that legalization could provide better funding to existing social programs.203 Consequently, if Nebraskans continue to gamble, all
parties are likely best served through legalization.204
2.

Public Support

Public support for ending the prohibition on sports gambling is
strong for three principal reasons: (1) public sentiment supports
sports gambling, (2) sports gambling would create employment opportunities, and (3) it provides a safer alternative to the black market.
First, public sentiment supports the legalization of sports gambling. In fact, 60% of Americans approve of sports gambling.205 Furthermore, a 2017 University of Massachusetts Lowell poll found that
only 33% of Americans oppose sports gambling.206 This is in sharp
contrast to PASPA’s enactment, when 56% of Americans were op198. Id.; see also Other Voices: Nebraska Should Legalize Sports Betting Following
Court Decision, SIOUX CITY J. (May 29, 2018), https://siouxcityjournal.com/othervoices-nebraska-should-legalize-sports-betting-following-court-decision/article_c7
9cc39e-df40-5266-a2a5-40712e218e5f.html [https://perma.unl.edu/M9BL-4FCF]
[hereinafter Other Voices] (“The American Gaming Association estimates that
Americans illegally wager $150 billion a year.”).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Lange-Kubick, supra note 185.
202. Other Voices, supra note 198. But see Associated Press, supra note 173 (explaining that state senators, such as Senator Russ Karpisek, have challenged Governor Ricketts by pointing to the state deficit) (“[W]e sit here [in Nebraska] and
complain about property taxes, and this is something that we can do about it. But
no, we’re not even going to look at it. It makes no sense . . . .”).
203. Other Voices, supra note 198.
204. See Lange-Kubick, supra note 185.
205. National Research Group, National Research Group (NRG) Releases Polling Data
on Attitudes Towards Sports Gambling in the Wake of Supreme Court Decision
and on the Eve of Game 4 of NBA Finals, CISION: PR NEWSWIRE (June 8, 2018),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/national-research-group-nrg-releas
es-polling-data-on-attitudes-towards-sports-gambling-in-the-wake-of-supremecourt-decision-and-on-the-eve-of-game-4-of-nba-finals-300662457.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/9RJZ-8PDR].
206. Minton, supra note 195.
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posed.207 Indeed, roughly 60% of Nebraskans also approve of sports
gambling.208 This rise in popularity is likely correlated to a rise of
user activity. For example, a 2008 Gallup poll suggested that one in
six Americans gamble on professional sports every year.209 By 2016,
that number doubled to one in three.210 As a result, sports gambling
has become a popular, accepted activity that could provide a new
stream of revenue for Nebraska.
Second, the legalization of sports gambling would create jobs in
Nebraska. In fact, with favorable tax and licensing conditions, Oxford
Economics predicts Nebraska would gain 1,248 jobs.211 Those jobs
would create over $55 million dollars of labor income.212 In addition,
the economic impact from those jobs would result in over $212 million
in sales and $118 million in state GDP.213 The result is approximately
$50 million dollars of direct revenue to the state.214 Moreover, legalized sports gambling would lead to indirect job growth. These jobs
would not just be in the sports gambling industry.215 By legalizing
sports gambling, ancillary jobs would be needed to support the industry, which may include, for example, graphic designers, web specialists, telephone operators, accountants, and lawyers.216 This demand
could lead to hundreds, or even thousands of jobs, depending on the
market,217 directly contributing to Governor Pete Ricketts’s declaration that “[o]ur mission is to grow Nebraska and create more and better paying jobs.”218
207. Id.
208. See Joe Harris, Nebraska Sees Push to Legalize Sports Betting: Nebraskans May
Soon Be Able to Bet on Sports, ABC 8 KLKN-TV (May 14, 2018), http://www.klkn
tv.com/story/38227934/nebraska-sees-push-to-legalize-sports-betting [https://per
ma.unl.edu/5L9R-K76R] (statement of Senator Paul Schumacher) (“I have seen a
good statistical analysis of the mentality of the voters towards expanded gambling in general and it’s pushing 60 percent.”).
209. Minton, supra note 195.
210. Id.
211. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF LEGALIZED SPORTS BETTING, OXFORD ECONOMICS 50 (May
2017), https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/AGA-Oxford%20-%
20Sports%20Betting%20Economic%20Impact%20Report1.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/D56M-T8B6].
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. Andrew Vacca, Sports Betting: Why the United States Should Go All in, 11 WILLAMETTE SPORTS L.J. 1, 10 (2014).
216. Id. at 11.
217. See id. at 10.
218. Jerry Purvis, Gov. Pete Ricketts: ‘When We’re Known as a State Where People Can
Do Business, Companies Will Invest in Us’, STAR-HERALD (Sept. 21, 2018), https://
www.starherald.com/news/local_news/gov-pete-ricketts-when-we-re-known-as-astate/article_024b2415-510d-5e12-a89f-1935a9a982b1.html [https://perma.unl
.edu/83UM-XYX4].
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Third, the legalization of sports gambling would provide a safer alternative to the black market. Indeed, the prohibition on sports gambling created a vast underground black market.219 This market
continued to grow in spite of PASPA.220 The black market’s growth is
almost certainly a reflection of public sentiment.221 That sentiment is
verified by the market’s size, where $150 billion is wagered annually.222 Absent proper regulation, organized crime syndicates will continue to thrive, especially as public sentiment continues to favor and
fund illegal sports gambling.223 However, the legalization of sports
gambling would offer Nebraskans a safer alternative where operators
adhere to regulations, consumer protections, and other safeguards.224
Thus, legalizing sports gambling would allow Nebraska lawmakers to
capture the black market, regulate it properly, and better align with
public sentiment.225
3.

Consumer Protection

Integrity standards can minimize concerns over legalizing sports
gambling by protecting (1) young people and those suffering from addiction, (2) the public’s confidence that games are free of corruption,
and (3) consumers and individuals placing bets.
First, integrity standards must include regulation and protection
for young people and those suffering from addiction. This was a primary reason for the enactment of PASPA.226 A gambling commission
study verified this concern, finding that “the percentages of pathological and problem adolescent gamblers consistently doubled those of the
adult population.”227 Furthermore, sports gambling serves as a gateway to other forms of gambling.228 Accordingly, Nebraska should include a prohibition of gambling by persons under the age of 21,229 a
prohibition on advertising that targets those under the age of 21, and
a requirement that gambling entities provide information about the
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Vacca, supra note 215, at 11.
Id. at 11.
See id. at 12.
Other Voices, supra note 198.
Id.
Minton, supra note 195.
Id.
S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 5 (1991).
John Warren Kindt & Thomas Asmar, College and Amateur Sports Gambling:
Gambling Away Our Youth?, 8 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 221, 234 (2002).
228. Id.
229. Senate Democratic Leader Charles E. Schumer, Protecting the Games We Love
After Murphy v. NCAA: A Federal Framework for Consumer Protection and
Sports Integrity, SENATE DEMOCRATS, https://www.democrats.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Consumer_Protection_Sports_Integrity_Framework.pdf [https://perma
.unl.edu/Y3ZZ-G5CB ] (last visited Sept. 3, 2018).
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dangers of addiction to those placing bets.230 Prominent members of
the United States Senate have already endorsed this regulatory
framework.231
Second, integrity standards must protect the public’s confidence
that games are free of corruption. This was also a chief concern
against which PASPA was meant to guard.232 Indeed, sports and
sports gambling have had an illustrious history together.233 Consequently, a strong state regulatory framework must require entities
that accept bets to “share appropriate information in a timely fashion
with the league or governing body of sport” and “[state] law enforcement or other appropriate oversight bodies.”234 In addition, a strong
state regulatory framework should require all leagues and sports to
have “strong limitations and prohibitions on any athlete, coach, official, team, or league representative from taking a financial stake in
any wager.”235 Thus, a strong state regulatory framework supports
the integrity of sports while alleviating the chief concerns of PASPA.
Third, integrity standards must be implemented to protect the individuals who place bets. In this respect, regulation should “lay out
the administrative limits on sports wagering and the rights and limitations applicable to both the individual placing a wager on a sporting
event and any [entity] that chooses to offer sports wagering.”236 Administrative limits should include agreements between state and governing sports bodies detailing the types of bets allowed, how official
league data is used, mechanisms for redressing consumers who are
unfairly harmed by betting activities or fraudulent schemes, and restrictions for online and mobile betting to prevent unfair competitive
advantages.237 Regulations should also include limits that prohibit
betting on specific events, such as high school sports.238 By adding
these restrictions, Nebraska can legalize sports gambling, protect consumers, and limit corruption.239
D.

Proposed Oversight

A regulatory scheme for sports gambling would require (1) the creation of a state gaming commission, (2) the expansion of the Nebraska
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
See id.
Fielkow et al., supra note 3, at 30.
See generally id. (discussing the history of sports gambling and discussing various examples where sports gambling has corrupted the outcome of sport).
Schumer, supra note 229.
Id.
Levinson, supra note 93, at 157.
Schumer, supra note 229.
Levinson, supra note 93, at 168.
See id.

742

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 98:718

Department of Revenue, and (3) the support of the Nebraska Gamblers Assistance Program.
1.

Nebraska Gaming Commission

Nebraska should create a gaming commission to manage and regulate the sports gambling industry. The primary purpose of the commission would be twofold: to protect consumers by enforcing
regulations and to collect revenues. In this respect, Nebraska’s gaming commission would be very similar to those of other states.240 However, to create a gaming commission, Nebraska’s unicameral would
have to authorize the commission through an act of legislation.241 The
proposed Act could read as follows:
The [Nebraska Gaming Commission] is created within the [Nebraska Department of Revenue]. The [Commission] shall have the powers and duties specified in this act and all other powers necessary and proper to fully and
effectively execute and administer this act for the purpose of licensing, regulating, and enforcing the system of [sports gambling] established under this
act.242

Furthermore, the commission should have the authority to enforce
standards and regulations. An example would be the power to:
[I]nspect, examine, audit, impound, seize, or assume physical control of, or
summarily remove from the premises all books, ledgers, documents, writings,
photocopies, correspondence, records, videotapes, including electronically
stored records, money receptacles, other containers and their contents, equipment in which the records are stored, or other gaming related equipment and
supplies on or around the premises, including counting rooms.243

240. See Nev. Gaming Control Bd.: New Legislator Training, NEV. GAMING COMM’N
STATE GAMING CONTROL BD. (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/
Research/LegInfo/Orientation/2016-17/Handouts/NGCB.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/F3JN-WKJR].
241. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 2-1201 (Reissue 2010).
242. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 432.204 (1997) (The Michigan Gaming Control Board was
created under the oversight of the Michigan Department of Treasury. The creation of a Nebraska Gaming Commission would require similar structuring under
its own Department of Revenue in order to maintain consistency with other authorized state gambling oversight. In addition, inherent to the creation of Michigan’s Gaming Control Board is the power to oversee sports gambling activities.
Michigan Sports Betting, THELINES, https://www.thelines.com/michigan/ [https://
perma.unl.edu/R6GC-XBZH] (last visited Jan. 8, 2019)). See also NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 463 (1959) (detailing the purpose, scope, and powers of the Nevada Gaming Commission. Nevada’s Gaming Commission has regulated sports gambling
since 1955 and represents a historically proven approach to sports gambling regulation.). Thus, Michigan and Nevada provide excellent examples of legislative
templates for Nebraska to follow.
243. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 432.204a (1997) (building on the 1955 statutory language
granting power to the Nevada Gaming Commission). NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 463.140 (1955).
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These types of powers would help the commission enforce standards and regulations to protect consumers.244 In addition, the commission should be responsible for implementing reasonable tax rates
and licensing to maximize revenue.
Reasonable tax rates and licensing would allow operators to more
easily adjust to legalization.245 If tax rates and licensing fees are too
high, operators may choose not to do business in Nebraska.246 Also, if
the number of licenses is too limited, operators may not have the ability to do business in Nebraska.247 Thus, the ideal tax rate, “in order to
maximize tax revenue . . . is between 10 and 15 percent.”248 As tax
rates rise above that threshold, tax revenue begins to fall sharply.249
In this respect, tax rates appear to be inelastic.250 In contrast, licensing fees appear to be very elastic and can vary substantially from state
to state.251 Thus, a proposed statutory language should provide:
[F]or the licensing, regulation, and control of [sports gambling] operations,
manufacturers and distributors of gaming devices and gaming related equipment and supplies, and persons who participate in gaming; to provide the distribution of revenue for public education, public safety and economic
development; authorizing limited [sports gambling] operations within the
state of [Nebraska]; to vest authority for the licensing, regulation, and control
of [sports gambling] in the [Nebraska Gaming Commission]; to restrict certain
244. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 432.204a.
245. Minton, supra note 195.
246. See id. (“For example, Pennsylvania recently passed legislation to legalize onand off-line sports betting when the federal prohibition is repealed. However, the
legislation set fees for licensure higher than the market will likely be willing to
bear. While Nevada bookies currently pay a fee of under 7 percent of gross gaming revenues, the Pennsylvania legislature set the tax rate at 34 percent of gross
gaming revenues, on top of the $10 million one-time licensing fee. These costs
represent an enormous barrier to entry that significantly increases licensed bookies’ operating costs. As a result, few operators will be able to enter Pennsylvania’s
legal market and those that do will not be able to offer rates as competitive as
those of their illegal counterparts. This makes it likely that the legal sports betting market in Pennsylvania will fail to thrive, causing consumers to either cross
the state line seeking friendlier regulatory environments or continue patronizing
illegal operators.”).
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See id.
251. See, e.g., Minton, supra note 195 (New Jersey: $400,000 licensing fee, 17.5% tax
on gross gaming revenue. New York: 10% tax on gross gaming revenue. Michigan: $200,000 licensing fee, 10% tax on gross gaming revenue. Kentucky:
$250,000 licensing fee, taxes equal to 20% of handle. West Virginia: $250,000
licensing fee, 10% tax on gross gaming revenue. Nevada: 1% licensing fee (on
gross gaming revenue), 6.75% tax on gross gaming revenue above $134,000 per
month); Megan Stewart, SCOTUS Gambling Ruling Doesn’t Change Sports Betting in Nebraska, Iowa, 3 NEWS NOW (May 14, 2018), https://www.3newsnow
.com/news/local-news/gambling-commission-scotus-ruling-doesnt-change-sportsbetting-in-iowa [https://perma.unl.edu/MUN7-JMUE] (Iowa House Study Bill
592 proposed an 8% tax and $25,000 licensing fee).
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political contributions; to establish a code of ethics for certain persons involved in gaming; to create certain funds; to impose and authorize certain
taxes and fees; to impose penalties; to authorize conservators under certain
circumstances; and to make an appropriation.252

This language creates a regulatory body (the Nebraska Gaming Commission) that has the authority to enforce standards and regulations
while also collecting revenues for the State.
2.

Nebraska Department of Revenue

The Nebraska Department of Revenue would need to provide oversight for the newly formed Nebraska Gaming Commission. Oversight
for the Nebraska Gaming Commission would be necessary to assist in
collecting revenues. In addition, oversight of the Gaming Commission
would be similar to the oversight of other gambling agencies, such as
the Nebraska Lottery Division, Charitable Gaming Division, and Nebraska Racing Commission. All of these agencies are responsible for
niche gaming markets such as charitable gaming,253 state lotteries,254
and pari-mutuel betting on horse racing.255 Ultimately, the Nebraska
Department of Revenue provides oversight for these entities and their
collection of revenue.256 For example:
The Nebraska Bingo Act, the Nebraska County and City Lottery Act, the Nebraska Lottery and Raffle Act, the Nebraska Pickle Card Lottery Act, the Nebraska Small Lottery and Raffle Act, and section 9-701 shall be administered
and enforced by the Charitable Gaming Division of the Department of Revenue, which division is hereby created. The Department of Revenue shall make
annual reports to the Governor, Legislature, Auditor of Public Accounts, and
Attorney General on all tax revenue received, expenses incurred, and other
activities relating to the administration and enforcement of such acts.257

In this respect, similar language should be proposed to allow the Department of Revenue to have oversight over the proposed Nebraska
Gaming Commission.258 This oversight would allow the Department
252. MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 432.1 to 432.278 (2017). Michigan enacted its Gaming Control Board to regulate casino gaming activities. Prior to its enactment, Michigan,
like Nebraska, limited its gaming activities to pari-mutuel horseracing, state lottery, and charitable gaming. See Michigan Gaming Summary, UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA LAS VEGAS CENTER FOR GAMING RESEARCH, https://gaming.unlv.edu/abs
tract/mi_main.html [https://perma.unl.edu/K939-4XGV] (last visited Jan. 1,
2019). Thus, Nebraska should look to Michigan’s statutory language as a model
to follow when creating its own regulatory body.
253. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 9-201–9-266; §§ 9-301–9-356; §§ 9-401–9-437; §§ 9-601–9653 (Reissue 2012). Charitable gaming consists mostly of bingo, pickle cards, and
keno. Id.
254. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 9-801–9-842 (Reissue 2012).
255. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 2-1203–2-1246 (Reissue 2012).
256. NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-1,101 (2013).
257. Id.
258. See id.

2020]

A GOOD BET FOR THE GOOD LIFE

745

of Revenue to provide direct assistance in revenue collection259 and
would be similar to its oversight of other state gambling agencies.260
3.

Nebraska Gamblers Assistance Program

The creation of the Nebraska Gaming Commission should include
financial support for the Nebraska Gamblers Assistance Program. The
Nebraska Gamblers Assistance Program was created to “counter the
negative impact of gambling addiction with effective, evidence-based
prevention and treatment services for Nebraskans and their families.”261 Indeed, this effort has been codified, stating:
The Legislature finds that the main sources of funding for assistance to problem gamblers are the Charitable Gaming Operations Fund as provided in section 9-1,101 and the State Lottery Operation Trust Fund as provided in
section 9-812. It is the intent of the Legislature that such funding be used
primarily for counseling and treatment services for problem gamblers and
their families who are residents of Nebraska.262

Therefore, under the Department of Revenue, the Charitable Gaming
Division, and the State Lottery Division, revenues are collected to subsidize the Gamblers Assistance Program.263 Accordingly, the Nebraska Gaming Commission should do the same. In this respect, the
legislature should adopt similar language to include the Nebraska
Gaming Division as an agency that supports the Nebraska Gamblers
Assistance Program.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nebraska should legalize and regulate sports gambling. The Supreme Court’s holding in Murphy makes clear that sports gambling is
a state matter. Many states have already legalized sports gambling
and are recognizing the benefits. For Nebraska, sports betting has economic incentives and public support. Potential concerns are offset by
strong integrity standards and regulations. The creation of a gaming
commission would help these efforts. Nevertheless, legalization and
regulation can only occur with a state referendum. Thus, the people of
Nebraska must decide. On balance, the legalization of sports gambling
in Nebraska is a good bet for the good life.

259. See id.
260. Id.
261. About Us, NEB. GAMBLERS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, https://problemgambling
.nebraska.gov/about-us [https://perma.unl.edu/H2KW-JEQ7] (last visited Oct. 11,
2018).
262. NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-1001 (2013).
263. See id.

